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Non{technical Summary
Since the late 1970s and continuing through the mid-2000s, overall wage inequality
has been increasing in the U.S., Germany, and the UK as well as in other countries. As
possible explanations of these trends, most of the literature has focused on skill-biased
technological change (SBTC), the supply of skilled workers and changes in institutions
such as the decline in unionization and changes in the minimum wage. SBTC has been
the most prominent explanation, arguing that the increase in demand for skills is stronger
than the simultaneous increase in the supply, leading to an increase in wage inequality.
Recent studies have proposed as a nuanced version of SBTC that technological change
can have a "polarizing" eect on the labor market rather than uniformly favoring more
skilled groups. That is, technological change can favor highly skilled groups at the expense
of less skilled routine-manual and routine-cognitive workers and to the advantage of less
skilled (non-routine-)manual workers. Starting in the 1990s, there seems to be evidence
for polarization in employment in the U.S., Germany, and the UK, while the evidence for
polarization of wages is restricted to the U.S..
It has often been argued that for SBTC to be a compelling explanation of labor
market trends, the trends have to be similar across dierent countries having access to
the same technology. In light of the polarizing wage trends in the U.S. since the 1990s and
considering the strong increase in wage inequality across the entire wage distribution in
Germany since the mid-1990s, there are interesting parallels as well as dierences between
the two countries. These observations motivate our paper, which compares trends in wage
inequality in the U.S. and in Germany using a unied framework of analysis based on
comparable data. In addition, we account for potential cohort eects, an issue which is
mostly ignored by the recent literature on wage inequality, even though SBTC may have
a bias in the age/cohort dimension.
We examine trends in wage inequality within and across cohorts of full-time working
men by describing a set of quantiles. Unconditional wage dispersion in both countries has
been rising since the end of the 1970s. However, we nd a pattern of wage polarization
only in the United States after 1985. In Germany, the 80% quantile increases faster than
the 50% quantile which in turn increases faster than the 20% quantile, while in the U.S.,
the 80% quantile outpaces both the 50% quantile and the 20% quantile.
Building upon the approach developed by MaCurdy and Mroz (1995), we separately
identify cohort, age, and macroeconomic eects on wage proles and conrm that between
1979 and 2004, there was, based on conditional time trends, widening wage dispersion in
both the U.S. and Germany. This is the case if we consider trends for wages at the median
between skill-groups as well as quantile specic time trends within skill-groups. However,
there are many distinct patterns across the two countries. For example, for the U.S. we
nd that time-trends at the median are more positive for high-skilled workers than for
lesser skilled workers throughout the entire period { the medium-low-skilled gap ceases
to increase during the 1990s. Moreover, time-trends within both the group of low- and
medium-skilled workers start polarizing at the end of the 1980s. Trends in Germany are
more dicult to interpret. While we nd evidence for polarization in Germany across
skill-groups regarding conditional wage trends at the median, we nd growing inequality
within the group of low-skilled and median skilled workers after 1985. Moreover, we see a
large role played by cohort eects in Germany { suggesting a role for supply-side eects
or an interaction with institutions in Germany { while we nd only small cohort eects
in the U.S..
In addition to wage trends, we analyze the changes in the skill composition of the
workforce and nd strong parallel movements between the U.S. and Germany. In both
countries, the decline of the share of low-skilled workers stopped in the mid-1990s and
the mean age of low-skilled workers fell strongly between the 1980s and the late 1990s.
Furthermore, analyzing 10-year changes in employment by age-education cells, we nd
in both countries no evidence for polarization of employment in the 1980s and a trend
towards polarization of employment in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Our results are mixed. On the one hand, there is some similar evidence for wages
and, in particular, for employment in the U.S. and Germany which is consistent with
a technology driven polarization of labor market. On the other hand, certain patterns
in wage inequality across the two economies dier strongly enough so that we believe
technology eects alone cannot explain the empirical ndings. Episodic changes resulting
from changes in institutional factors such as unionization or the minimum wage may
explain the dierences.
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Das Wichtigste in Kurze
Seit Ende der 70er Jahre bis in die Mitte des ersten Jahrzehnts des neuen Jahrtausends
beobachtet man einen Anstieg der Lohnungleichheit in den USA, in Grobritannien und
in Deutschland, wie auch in anderen Landern. Als mogliche Erklarungen fur diese En-
twicklung werden in der Literatur der qualikationsverzerrte technische Fortschritt (skill-
biased technological change, SBTC), Veranderungen im Angebot von hoher qualizierten
Arbeitnehmern und sich verandernde Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen (z.B. Ruckgang der Gew-
erkschaftmitgliedschaft und damit einhergehend eine Abnahme der Tarifbindung) genannt.
SBTC ist der in der Literatur popularste Erklarungsansatz. Dieser unterstellt eine steigende
Nachfrage nach hochqualizierten Arbeitskraften, welche hoher ausfallt als der parallel
verlaufende Anstieg des Angebots an hoherqualizierten Arbeitskraften.
Neuere Studien argumentieren, dass der technische Fortschritt einen "polarisieren-
den" Eekt auf den Arbeitsmarkt habe kann, anstatt gleichmaig hoher qualizierte Ar-
beitskrafte relativ zu niedriger qualizierten Arbeitskraften besserzustellen. Vielmehr
protieren sowohl Hoch- als auch Niedrigqualizierte, welche Nicht-Routinetatigkeiten
ausfuhren (diese Arbeitskrafte sind oft am oberen und unterem Rand der Lohnverteilung
zu nden), relativ zu Arbeitskraften in der Mitte Lohnverteilung, die in der Vergangenheit
Routinetatigkeiten ausfuhrten. Seit den 90er Jahren gibt es Evidenz fur eine Polarisierung
des Beschaftigung in den USA, Grobritannien und Deutschland. Hinweise auf eine Po-
larisierung von Lohnen gibt es jedoch lediglich fur die USA.
Es wird haug argumentiert, die Validitat des SBTC als Erklarungsansatz impliziere
ahnliche Arbeitsmarktentwicklungen in Landern mit gleichem technologischen Entwick-
lungsstand. Angesichts der Polarisierung der Lohne in den USA und dem Anstieg der
Lohnungleichheit uber die gesamte Verteilung in Deutschland seit den 90er Jahren gibt
es sowohl interessante Parallelen als auch Unterschiede zwischen diesen beiden Landern.
Diese Beobachtungen motivieren unsere Studie, welche die Entwicklungen der Lohnun-
gleichheit in beiden Landern mithilfe desselben okonometrischen Ansatzes auf Basis zweier
vergleichbarer Datensatze untersucht. Wir berucksichtigen explizit die Moglichkeit von
Kohorteneekten. Diese werden in der Literatur oft vernachlassigt, obwohl der technolo-
gische Fortschritt eine Verzerrung in der Alters/Kohortendimension aufweisen kann.
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht Entwicklungen der Lohnungleichheit innerhalb und
zwischen Kohorten vollzeiterwerbstatiger Manner. Hierzu werden verschiedene Quantile
der Lohnverteilung betrachtet. Die unkonditionale Lohnungleichheit ist in beiden Landern
seit Ende der 70er Jahre angestiegen. Seit Mitte der 80er Jahre nden wir jedoch nur fur
die USA Hinweise auf eine Polarisierung der Lohne: In Deutschland steigen die Lohne
am 80. Perzentil schneller als die Lohne am Median, welche hingegen schneller steigen als
die am 20. Perzentil. In den USA hingegen steigen die Lohne am 80. und 20. Perzentil
schneller als die Lohne am Median.
Aufbauend auf dem von MaCurdy und Mroz (1995) vorgeschlagenen Ansatz identi-
zieren wir Kohorteneekte, Alterseekte und Zeiteekte (makrookonomische Eekte).
Die geschatzten Zeiteekte bestatigen die steigende Lohnungleichheit in beiden Landern
fur den Zeitraum 1979-2004. Dies gilt sowohl fur den Fall der Betrachtung von Medi-
anlohnen zwischen verschiedenen Qualizierungsgruppen als auch fur die Entwicklung
innerhalb dieser Gruppen. Fur verschiedene Unterzeitraume nden wir allerdings Un-
terschiede in den Entwicklungen zwischen den USA und Deutschland. So divergieren
die Lohne am Median zwischen hoher und weniger hoch qualizierten Beschaftigten in
den USA uber den gesamtem Zeitraum, wahrend die Lohnlucke zwischen Mittel- und
Niedrigqualizierten seit Ende der 80er Jahre zuruckgeht. Zudem nden wir polarisierende
makrookonomische Trends innerhalb der Gruppe der Mittel- und Niedrigqualizierten.
Fur Deutschland ist die Interpretation schwieriger. Auch hier nden wir Hinweise auf
eine Polarisierung zwischen den Qualizierungsgruppen, jedoch sehen wir gleichzeitig eine
wachsende Lohnungleichheit innerhalb aller dieser Gruppen. Die geschatzten Kohorten-
eekte weisen zudem auf eine erklarende Rolle der Arbeitsangebotsseite und/oder eine
Erklarung durch die Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen hin. Fur die USA sind diese Kohortenef-
fekte wesentlich kleiner.
Zusatzlich zu den Lohntrends untersuchen wir Veranderungen in den Anteilen der
verschiedenen Qualizierungsgruppen uber den Zeitablauf. Diese Verlaufe sind in den
USA und Deutschland sehr ahnlich. In beiden Landern endet die Abnahme des Anteils der
Niedrigqualizierten Mitte der 90er Jahre und das Durchschnittsalter dieser Gruppe fallt
stark zwischen den 80er Jahre bis Ende der 90er. Weiterhin analysieren wir Veranderung
der Beschaftigung in 10-Jahres Intervallen nach Alters-Qualikationszellen. Fur beide
Lander nden wir hier Evidenz fur eine Polarisierung seit Mitte der 90er und keinerlei
Evidenz fur solch eine Entwicklung in fruheren Perioden.
Unsere Resultate lassen daher keine eindeutigen Schlufolgerungen zu. Einerseits gibt
es ahnliche Evidenz in beiden Landern hinsichtlich der Entwicklung der Lohnungleichheit
und insbesondere in der Beschaftigungsentwicklung, welche konsistent ist mit einer durch
den technologischen Fortschritt getriebenen Polarisierung des Arbeitsmarkts. Anderer-
seits nden wir einige Aspekte in der Entwicklung der Lohnungleichheit, die sich stark
zwischen den Landern unterscheiden. Hieraus schlieen wir, dass SBTC alleine nicht die
empirischen Befunde erklaren kann. Veranderungen in den Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen,
wie z.B. die Abnahme in der Tarifbindung oder Veranderungen des Mindestlohns konnen
zur Erklarung dieser Unterschiede beitragen.
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1 Introduction
A substantial body of research has documented increasing wage inequality in industrial-
ized countries. Since the late 1970s and continuing through the mid-2000s, overall wage
inequality has been increasing in the U.S. (e.g. Autor et al., 2008; Lemieux, 2006a), Ger-
many (e.g. Dustmann et al., 2009), the UK (e.g. Machin and Van Reenen, 2008), Canada
(e.g. Boudarbat et al., 2006), and Australia (e.g. Atkinson and Leigh, 2007). As possible
explanations of these trends, most of the literature has focused on skill-biased techno-
logical change (SBTC), the supply of skilled workers, changes in institutions such as the
decline in unionization and changes in the minimum wage, as well as changes in social
norms. SBTC has been the most prominent explanation (see the survey by Katz and
Autor, 1999), which argues that the increase in demand for skills is stronger than the
simultaneous increase in the supply, leading to an increase in wage inequality.
In light of the continuous rise in wage inequality at the top of the wage distribution
in the U.S. and the stagnant or even decreasing wage dispersion at the bottom of the
wage distribution, several recent studies have proposed as a nuanced version of SBTC
that technological change can have a "polarizing" eect on the labor market rather than
uniformly favoring more skilled groups (e.g. Autor et al., 2003, 2006, 2008; Goos and
Manning, 2007). That is, technological change { for example computerization { can favor
highly skilled groups at the expense of less skilled routine-manual and routine-cognitive
workers and to the advantage of less skilled (non-routine-)manual workers. While labor
market trends seem to be more benecial for high-skilled jobs relative to medium-skilled
jobs, various studies nd a disproportionate growth of employment for low-wage jobs and
a possibly higher wage growth (Autor et al., 2008). Starting in the 1990s, there seems
to be evidence for polarization in employment in the U.S., Germany, and the UK, while
the evidence for polarization of wages is restricted to the U.S. (Goos and Manning, 2007;
Autor et al., 2008; Autor and Dorn, 2009; Dustmann et al., 2009).
The literature has often argued that for SBTC to be a compelling explanation of labor
market trends, the trends have to be similar across dierent countries having access to the
same technology (Card and Lemieux, 2001). Until the mid-1990s, trends in wage inequal-
ity diered strongly between the U.S. and Germany with increases in wage inequality in
Germany being restricted to the upper part of the wage distribution (Dustmann et al.,
2009; Fitzenberger, 1999). Until the mid-2000s, most of the literature, in fact, assumed
that wage inequality in Germany had been stable since the 1980s and it has been debated
as to whether and to what extent this implies a rejection of the SBTC hypothesis.1 In
light of the polarizing wage trends in the U.S. since the 1990s and in Germany during
1See e.g. Beaudry and Green (2003), Prasad (2004), and Dustmann et al. (2009) as well as the
discussion of the literature in these papers.
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the 1980s and considering the strong increase in wage inequality across the entire wage
distribution in Germany since the mid-1990s, there are interesting parallels as well as dif-
ferences between the two countries.2 These observations motivate our paper which takes
a fresh look at the comparison of trends in wage inequality in the U.S. and in Germany
using a unied framework of analysis based on comparable data. Furthermore, we account
for potential cohort eects, an issue which is mostly ignored by the recent literature on
wage inequality (see Card and Lemieux (2001) as a notable exception).3 Although SBTC
may have a bias in the age/cohort dimension, most of the recent literature on trends in
wage inequality (see e.g. Autor et al., 2008; Dustmann et al., 2009) restricts itself to a
comparison of cross-sectional age or experience proles in dierent years.4
Next, we review the literature in more detail. Autor et al. (2003) rst proposed
the task-based polarization hypothesis, focusing on the way technology aects the tasks
performed at a job. Occupations are distinguished by the composition of the dierent
tasks. Technological change results in a substitution of routine tasks by computers and
other machines. Therefore, demand for workers performing non-routine tasks increases.
For the U.S., Autor et al. (2003) conrm that employment in occupations involving routine
tasks has fallen considerably, whereas employment in high-skilled non-routine jobs in the
upper part of the wage distribution and in non-routine manual jobs in the lower part of the
wage distribution has increased. At about the same time, Manning (2004) and Goos and
Manning (2007) argue that the task-based approach may also rationalize the empirical
fact that the share of low wage jobs involving non-routine tasks with very low skill input
has increased. This is the basis for the polarization hypothesis stating that technological
change may result in a reduction of jobs in the middle of the wage distribution and a
disproportionate growth of both high-wage and low-wage jobs.
Conrming the polarization trend, Autor et al. (2008) provide evidence for a polariza-
2In Germany, the increase in wage inequality in the lower half of the wage distribution began in the
mid-1990s (Kohn, 2006; Gernandt and Pfeier, 2007; Dustmann et al., 2009). Between the early 1980s
and the early 1990s, when wage inequality was astonishingly stable in the lower part of the distribution,
wage growth at and below the median was substantially higher than in the decade to follow (Dustmann
et al., 2009; Fitzenberger, 1999).
3Card and Lemieux (2001) allow for imperfect substitutability between younger and older workers to
explain the fact that the large increase of the wage gap between young college- and high-school graduates
is mainly driven by a slowdown in the growth of college graduates in the U.S. during the 1980s. These
intercohort shifts in the supply of college graduates occurred while the relative demand for more highly
skilled workers kept increasing steadily. This resulted in a stronger rise of the college-high-school wage
gap for younger workers compared to older workers. The authors report similar ndings for the UK and
Canada. Carneiro and Lee (2008) reanalyze the rising college-high-school premium and provide evidence
that about half of the increase reported may be explained by an increased quality of college graduates
during this period. This demonstrates that cohort eects may also indicate certain selection processes.
4There exists an earlier literature on wage trends in the 1980s and 1990s which explicitly takes account
of possible cohort eects, see e.g. MaCurdy and Mroz (1995), Card and Lemieux (2001), Gosling et al.
(2000), Fitzenberger (1999), Fitzenberger et al. (2001) and Fitzenberger and Wunderlich (2002). Gen-
erally, while accounting for the identication problem in the estimation of age, period, and time eects,
this literature nds that cohort eects play a role in wage trends.
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tion of wages in the U.S. during the 1990s such that wage inequality only continued to rise
in the upper part of the wage distribution. Furthermore, Autor and Dorn (2009) nd that
employment and wages in low-skill service jobs, which involve non-routine manual tasks
and which pay low wages, have grown considerably since the early 1990s. If technology is
the driving force of labor market developments, we should expect to see similar patterns
in wage growth and polarization in other industrialized countries, provided institutions -
or other developments - do not cause dierent trends. Even though Goos and Manning
(2007) nd evidence for the growth of employment of both low-wage and high-wage jobs
in the UK, they argue that the polarization hypothesis cannot rationalize the nding that
wage inequality did not fall at the bottom of the wage distribution. However, Autor and
Dorn (2009) develop a theoretical model where the wage eects at the bottom of the
wage distribution are ambiguous, because they depend upon whether low-skilled jobs are
complements or substitutes of high-skilled jobs. Thus, technology driven polarization in
employment may also be consistent with rising wage inequality at the bottom of the wage
distribution.
In contrast to technology based explanations for the U.S., DiNardo et al. (1996) and
Lemieux (2006a) argue that increasing wage inequality in the 1980s and the early 1990s
can be explained to an important part by changing labor market institutions, i.e. falling
real minimum wages and deunionization, and changes in the composition of the workforce.
If this were the case, we would not necessarily expect to see similar patterns in wage growth
and polarization in other industrialized countries. Autor et al. (2008) argue that changing
minimum wages and institutions in the U.S. are unlikely to explain the continuing trend
of increasing wage inequality in the upper part of the wage distribution.
Spitz-Oener (2006) conrms the basic ndings of Autor et al. (2003) regarding em-
ployment trends in Germany from the late 1970s until the late 1990s. She shows a large
increase both in jobs involving non-routine analytical and interactive tasks, which tend to
be high-wage jobs, and in jobs involving manual tasks, which tend to be low-wage jobs.
In light of these stark changes in employment, it is dicult to rationalize the fairly large
stability in the lower part of the wage distribution in Germany until the mid-1990s.5
All recent studies analyzing wage trends in Germany nd increasing wage inequality
at the bottom of the wage distribution (e.g. Kohn, 2006; Gernandt and Pfeier, 2007;
Dustmann et al., 2009) since the mid-1990s { a nding that is not inconsistent with the
polarization hypothesis according to Autor and Dorn (2009). Dustmann et al. (2009)
show that occupations at the top of the wage distribution experienced the largest growth
of employment shares and growth of employment shares for occupations in the middle of
the wage distribution appears to be smaller than growth for occupations at the bottom of
5In a recent study on the gender wage gap, Black and Spitz-Oener (2007) conrm polarization in
employment for Germany, which is more pronounced for women compared to men.
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the wage distribution. They also nd a positive statistical relationship between the change
of the share in occupational employment and wage changes above the median, while this
correlation is negative below the median. The authors conclude that the development of
rising wage dispersion in the lower part of the wage distribution is better explained by
episodic changes, e.g. deunionization, than by technological change. The developments
in Germany until the mid-1990s are consistent with the SBTC hypothesis (Fitzenberger,
1999), if one allows for the possibility that growing wage inequality in the lower part
of the wage distribution was prevented by labor market institutions such as unions and
implicit minimum wages implied by the welfare state. Hence, the strong deunionization
(see Dustmann et al., 2009; Fitzenberger et al., 2010) is likely to have contributed to
the increase in inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution since the mid-1990s.
Antonczyk et al. (2009) analyze the changes between 1999 and 2006 in the German wage
structure of male workers and conclude that a task-based approach, based on task data
as used in Spitz-Oener (2006), cannot explain the rise in wage inequality. Gernandt and
Pfeier (2007) nd that the increase in wage inequality between 1994 and 2005 has been
much stronger for workers with low tenure compared to workers with high tenure. Thus,
new hirings, comprising disproportionately young workers, were aected to a large extent
by the increase in inequality, which could be an indication for cohort eects.
This paper examines trends in wage inequality within and across cohorts of full-time
working men in the U.S. and Germany by describing a set of quantiles. Wage dispersion
in both countries has been rising since the end of the 1970s, as is shown in gure 1 where
cumulated real log wage growth at the median, the 20% quantile, and the 80% quantile
are depicted for male workers for the period from 1979 to 2004. Despite strong evidence
of rising wage inequality in both economies, we nd a pattern of wage polarization only
in the United States after 1985 (Autor et al., 2008). Note that our study uses the term
'polarization in wages' if the ratio of the upper quantile (e.g. the 80% quantile) and the
median increases, while the ratio of the median and the lower quantile (e.g. the 20%
quantile) is stable or even decreases. In Germany, the 80% quantile increases faster than
the 50% quantile, which in turn increases faster than the 20% quantile, while in the U.S.,
the 80% quantile outpaces both the 50% quantile and the 20% quantile. Only until the
mid-1980s, the 20% quantile and the 50% quantile in Germany move in a parallel fashion,
suggesting polarization during the early 1980s. For the U.S., these two lower quantiles
show an almost parallel trend since about 1985. Thus, there has been wage polarization
in the U.S. since 1985 and in Germany prior to 1985.
For our econometric analysis, we use the approach developed by MaCurdy and Mroz
(1995), which allows us to separately identify cohort, age, and macroeconomic eects
on wage proles. Our main ndings can be summarized as follows. We conrm that
between 1979 and 2004, there was, based on conditional time trends, widening wage
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dispersion in both the U.S. and Germany. This is the case if we consider trends for wages
at the median between skill-groups as well as quantile specic time trends within skill-
groups. However, there are many distinct patterns across the two countries. For example,
for the U.S. we nd that time-trends at the median are more positive for high-skilled
workers than for lesser skilled workers throughout the entire period { the medium-low-
skilled gap ceases to increase during the 1990s. Moreover, time-trends within both the
group of low- and medium-skilled workers start polarizing at the end of the 1980s, while
within wage dispersion for high-skilled workers steadily increases. Trends in Germany are
more dicult to interpret. While we nd evidence for polarization in Germany across
skill-groups regarding conditional wage trends at the median, we nd growing inequality
within the group of low-skilled and median skilled workers after 1985. Moreover, we see a
large role played by cohort eects in Germany { suggesting a role for supply-side eects
or an interaction with institutions in Germany { while we nd only small cohort eects
in the U.S..
In addition to wage trends, we analyze the changes in the skill composition of the
workforce and nd strong parallel movements between the U.S. and Germany. In both
countries, the decline of the share of low-skilled workers stopped in the mid-1990s and
the mean age of low-skilled workers fell strongly between the 1980s and the late 1990s.
Furthermore, analyzing 10-year changes in employment by age-education cells, we nd
in both countries no evidence for polarization of employment in the 1980s and a trend
towards polarization of employment in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Our results, therefore, are mixed. On the one hand, there is some similar evidence in
wages { and in particular in employment { in the U.S. and Germany which is consistent
with a technology driven polarization of labor market. On the other hand, certain patterns
in wage inequality across the two economies dier strongly enough so that we believe
technology eects alone cannot explain the empirical ndings. Episodic changes resulting
from changes in institutional factors such as unionization or the minimum wage may
explain the dierences.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the two data-sets.
The third section presents the basic facts of wage growth and wage dispersion for the
U.S. and Germany. Section 4 introduces our version of the MaCurdy and Mroz (1995)
approach. The corresponding empirical results are presented in section 5. Finally, section
6 provides our conclusions. The appendix contains graphical illustrations of our estimation
results. Detailed estimation results are available upon request.
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2 Data
The data we use for our analysis are the U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS) and the
German IAB employment subsample (IABS). We make the two data-sets as comparable
as possible. We concentrate on the group on male workers who are between 25 and 55
years old. This avoids interference with ongoing education and early retirement.
2.1 CPS for U.S.
The U.S. data used for this analysis are from the Current Population Survey, Outgoing
Rotation Groups (CPS-ORG) from 1979-2004. The CPS-ORG data contain wage and
salary information for respondents during the month they levee the basic (monthly) survey.
Wages are inated to 2004 dollars using the CPI-U-RS. Workers' calculated hourly wage
rates are either the reported hourly wage (for the 60 percent of workers paid on that basis)
or weekly earnings divided by weekly hours (for the other 40 percent of workers). For
the latter group, earnings per week divided by the usual hours per week was used, unless
information on usual hours per week was missing (in 2004, for example, the gures were
missing for 5 percent of workers not paid on an hourly basis). In that case, the analysis
used the number of actual hours worked in the previous week to construct hourly wages.
While that procedure minimizes the number of workers excluded from the analysis, it
introduces some noise into the calculated hourly rate of pay because the actual hours
worked last week may dier from usual hours worked per week. For roughly 15 percent of
workers not paid on an hourly basis, the number of actual hours worked the previous week
was dierent from the usual hours per week. Most often, those workers indicated that
they worked part time in the previous week for various reasons, but usually worked full
time. The U.S. Census Bureau imputed data on hourly wage rates, usual weekly earnings,
and usual hours worked per week were used in the analysis. Over the sample period, the
percentage of workers with imputed wage data has increased and was 31 percent in 2004.
We consider male workers from the sample who (normally) work full time. The skill
level between 1979 and 1989 is measured as a categorical variable with three values re-
garding the years of schooling completed:
(U) 12 years or less of schooling (low-skilled)
(M) 13 to 15 years of schooling (medium-skilled)
(H) 16 years or more of schooling (high-skilled).
These categories are dened in a slightly dierent way after 1990 due to changes in the
CPS: (U) having a high school diploma or less and not having attended college; (M) having
attended college but not having received a degree; and (H) having at least a college degree.
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Age is measured continuously (in years). Observations are weighted by a person-weight
variable and by the hours worked in the preceding week.
2.2 IABS for Germany
The German data used in the empirical analysis is the IABS (IAB employment subsam-
ple). Although the IABS starts in 1975, we only use data starting from 1979, consistent
with the time period available in the CPS6, and we also inate wages to 2004 euros. The
IABS involves a randomly drawn 2% sample of employees who participate in the German
Social Security System and is provided by the Institute for Employment Research.7 The
IABS contains about 400,000 individuals in each annual cross-section. This data set or
previous versions of it, have been used to carry out several studies on the German labor
market (e.g. Fitzenberger, 1999; Dustmann et al., 2009).
There are two important advantages of using data from the IABS. First, the IABS is
a very large sample compared to survey data such as the German Socioeconomic Panel,
which is also often used in the analysis of wage trends.8 Second, since individuals are
followed over time, the data set remains representative for the workers contributing to
the social security system. There are three important disadvantages of the IABS. First,
there exists censoring of wages from above. When the daily gross wage exceeds the upper
social security threshold ('Beitragsbemessungsgrenze'), the daily social security threshold
is reported instead. This censoring aects roughly the top 10%-14% of the workers in the
wage distribution.9 Among university graduates, censoring from above can aect about
half of the population. This is one of the reasons why we estimate quantile regressions
of wages, which are robust against this kind of right censoring.10 Second, there exists a
structural break in 1984. Since that year, one-time payments and other bonuses have been
included in the reported earnings leading to an increase in the observed inequality of wages
at that time. The technique employed by Fitzenberger (1999) is used as a conservative
correction.11 Third, the IABS does not provide detailed information on hours worked,
6Between 1975 and 1979, a slight increase of wage dispersion in the upper part of the distribution
takes place and virtually no change in wage-dispersion in the lower part, as measured by the 80%-50%
and 50%-20% dierence of log-wages.
7It is mandatory for every employee in Germany to adhere to the German social security, given he
works regularly and his wage passes a certain earnings threshold. Civil servants are the largest group
of workers that do not participate in the German Social Security system. Taken into accounts further
exceptions (e.g. students), about 80% of the German employees are covered.
8Gernandt and Pfeier (2007) provide an overview of the data-sets used in recent studies regarding
wage dispersion in Germany.
9The value of this threshold changes annually.
10There exists also truncation from below in the IABS: If the wage lies below the lower social security
threshold, the employee is not obliged to pay social security contribution and is thus excluded. As we
concentrate on full-time working males, this restriction is negligible.
11See also Fitzenberger and Wunderlich (2002) and Dustmann et al. (2009) for similar correction
procedures.
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but it provides an indicator for full-time work. As we restrict the analysis to full-time
working males, our results are likely to be robust and comparable to the U.S.-data.12
Workers are grouped by their skills according to the following formal education levels
given in the IABS:
(U) without a vocational training degree (low-skilled)
(M) with a vocational training degree (medium-skilled)
(H) with a technical college ("Fachhochschule") or a university degree (high-skilled)
2.3 Construction of Cohort-Year-Skill Cells
Our level of analysis are wage quantiles by year, cohort/age, and skill level, where cohort
is dened by year of birth. For each cell, we calculate dierent quantiles for the real wage.
Applying the approach proposed by Fitzenberger (1999), this is done for the German data
in the following way. The IABS contains information on the social security insurance spells
comprising the starting point and the end point as well as the average daily gross wage13
(excluding employer's distribution) for this spell.
An annual wage observation for one individual is calculated as the weighted average
of the wages he earned during his dierent spells within one year, where the spell lengths
are used as the weights. The sum of the spell lengths for all individuals in one cell is used
to calculate the number of employed workers within this cell. This variable is used as a
weight in the regressions.
The next step consists of calculating the 20%, 50%, and 80% quantile for the cells,
where again the spell lengths are used as weights. We also record the sum of spell lengths
as cell weights. In the case of Germany, when the quantile coincides with the threshold, it
is recorded as being censored. These information are sucient for our empirical analysis
to estimate quantile regressions based on cell data. The cohort-year-skill cell data for
the CPS are constructed in an analogous way as for the German data, using the weights
described above.
12Trends in wage inequality among German full-time-working males are robust to either taking hourly
wages (provided e.g. in the German Socioeconomic Panel) or taking monthly wages (for details see e.g.
Dustmann et al., 2009).
13The daily social security threshold is reported instead if the daily gross wage exceeds the upper social
security threshold, see above.
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3 Basic Empirical Facts
3.1 Unconditional Wage Growth
Figure 1 depicts the unconditional wage growth jointly for all skill-groups between 1979
and 2004. For the U.S., wages at the three quantiles fall until 1996, with the largest
decline at the 20% quantile being -13 log percentage points (pp). Wages at the median
decline 10 log pp and those at the 80% quantile decline 4 log pp. This implies rising wage
dispersion both in the upper and the lower part of the U.S. wage distribution. Between
1996 and 2004, wages grow at all quantiles, whereby wages at the 20% quantile and at
the 80% quantile rise about 9 log pp, which is 1-2 log pp more than the rise of the wages
at the median. This widening of the wage distribution at the top and narrowing at the
bottom provides evidence of polarization of wages during the 1996 to 2004 period. Overall,
however, between 1979 and 2004 the dispersion both in the upper half of the distribution
(as measured by 80-50 log dierence) and in the bottom half (as measured by the 50-20
log dierence) increased.
For Germany, wages throughout the distribution start to grow in the mid-1980s, and
wages at the 80% quantile exhibit larger growth rates than those at the median and the
20% quantile. Wage inequality in the upper part of the wage distribution keeps rising
steadily since the beginning of the 1980s, while wage dispersion in the lower part of the
wage distribution only starts to increase in the mid-1990s. These results are in line with
Dustmann et al. (2009).14 Between 1979 and 2004, the 20% quantile, the median, and
the 80% quantile increase by 9, 15, and 20 log pp, respectively { cumulative real wage
growth between 1979 and 2004 is considerably higher in Germany compared to the U.S..
Finally, in Germany, the 20% quantile and the 80% quantile only grow both faster than
the median during the early 1980s { thus a polarization of wages can be observed only
for a short period of time.
Turning to skill-group specic trends, gure 2 shows the unconditional cross-sectional
wage growth at dierent quantiles conditional on education and gure 3 summarizes
overall wage dispersion (as measured by the 80-20 dierence of log-wages), as well as
dispersion in the lower and the upper part of the skill-specic wage distributions (as
measured by the 50-20 and 80-50 dierences, respectively).
Between 1979 and 1996 low-skilled workers in the U.S. lost about 32 to 34 log pp in
terms of real wages. At the same time, the sharpest decline of wage inequality in the lower
part of the distribution occurred among this group. Wages at the 20% quantile gained
12 log pp during the eight following years. Workers at the median and the 80% quantile
were also able to recover, but that recovery was less pronounced for these groups. The
14Note that Dustmann et al. (2009) use the 85% quantile and the 15% quantile.
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80-50 dierence stays rather stable over time, while the 50-20 dierence starts to decline
at the beginning of the 1990s. Wages of medium-skilled workers also increased after a
low in 1996 and a clear pattern of polarization is observable since the early 1990s, as
the 80-50 dierence keeps increasing and the 50-20 dierence starts to decrease. In the
U.S., only the group of high-skilled workers has higher real wages in 2004 than in 1979.
Although only wages at the lowest quantile incurred real wage losses between 1979 and
1996 among this group, wage inequality in both parts of the distribution is slightly but
steadily increasing since the late 1980s. Similar observations regarding the development
of the wage structure have been made by e.g. Autor et al. (2006).
In Germany, only low-skilled workers at the 20% quantile had lower real wages in 2004
than in 1979 (a 10 log pp cumulative decline). This wage-loss stems from a period of
sharp decline beginning in the early 1990s. During the last twelve years of observation,
the 20% quantile of wages fell by 20 log pp. Wages at the median also fell, but to
a lesser degree, while trends at the 80% quantile have been at since the early 1990s.
Up until 1991/92, wages moved quite uniformly along the entire wage distribution. In
1992/93 a severe recession took place in Germany and since then, wage dispersion has
been increasing in the lower as well in the upper part of the distribution.15 Medium-
skilled workers in Germany, making up the major part of the entire German workforce,
experience quite similar movements as described above for the overall wage distribution
not conditioning on educational-level { rising wage dispersion in the upper part beginning
in the 1980s and increasing wage inequality in the lower part of the distribution since the
mid-1990s. Furthermore, similar to the development of the entire wage-distribution, we
observe a polarizing pattern of wages until 1984. German high-skilled workers experience
considerable gains since the early 1980s: wages rose by 17 log pp and 30 log pp for workers
at the 20% quantile and the median respectively, resulting in an increasing dispersion in
the lower part of the conditional distribution of wages.
Figure 5 displays the skill premia (measured at the median) in both the U.S. and Ger-
many. In the U.S., the premia for high-skilled workers relative to medium-skilled workers
and for medium-skilled workers relative to low-skilled workers increased throughout the
entire 1979 to 2004 period. By contrast, the premium that medium-skilled German work-
ers receive relative to low-skilled workers fell during the early 1980s and grew slowly
between the mid-1980s and 2004. The premium that high-skilled workers receive relative
to medium-skilled workers in Germany grew substantially in the late-1980s and again in
the late-1990s and early 2000s.
15Most low-skilled workers nd themselves in the lower part of the overall wage distribution. This
result is thus in line with the facts we presented above.
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3.2 Changes in Employment
To assess the importance of technology eects on labor demand and other hypotheses
regarding wage trends, it is important to assess changes in the structure of employment.
Figure 4 plots the employment shares of the dierent skill-groups. Incidently, both in the
U.S. and Germany the share of low-skilled workers ceased to decline in the mid-1990s,
i.e. skill upgrading from low-skilled workers stopped at that time. For both countries
increased immigration might help to explain these trends.16 Medium-skilled workers in
both countries make up for the largest share in educational groups. Their employment
shares grew slightly until the mid-1990s and fell slightly afterwards in both the U.S. and
Germany. The share of high-skilled workers rises monotonically in both countries, while
the relative rise is more pronounced in Germany, doubling from 8% in 1979 to 16% in
2004, whereas over the same period the share in the U.S. rises from 16% to 22%.
To investigate changes in the age structure of employment, gure 4 further plots the
mean age of the workers in the dierent skill-groups in our samples over time. The average
age of U.S. medium-skilled and high-skilled workers has been increasing since the mid-
1980s. The mean age of low-skilled workers in the U.S. decreased strongly until the mid-
1990s and remained constant afterwards. For Germany, the mean age of medium-skilled
and high-skilled workers has been rising continuously since the mid-1990s. Similarly to
the U.S., the average age of low-skilled workers fell strongly until the middle of the 1990s
and grew slightly afterwards. In addition to the impact of immigration, this latter trend
may also be explained by the observation that older low-skilled workers tend to leave the
workforce to a larger extent compared to younger ones.
4 Empirical Approach
This section presents the empirical framework to investigate the movement of the entire
wage distribution for synthetic cohorts over time. A cohort is dened by the year of birth
of the worker.
In order to decompose between- and within-group shifts in the wage distribution, we
estimate various quantile regressions. We allow for the case that wage trends dier across
cohorts, indicating the presence of \cohort eects", and by quantiles indicating a trend
towards increasing or decreasing within group wage dispersion. Under certain conditions,
as will be made precise in the following, a cohort eect designates a movement of the
entire life-cycle wage prole for a given cohort relative to other cohorts. In providing a
16For Germany, following the reunication in 1990, a large inow of ethnic Germans as well as a wave
of immigration of workers from East Germany (the former German Democratic Republic, GDR) is well
documented in the literature (see e.g. Bundesamt fur Migration und Fluchtlinge, 2005; Fuchs-Schundeln
and Schundeln, 2009).
11
parsimonious representation of trends in the entire wage distribution, we are able to pin
down precisely the dierences in wage trends across groups of workers dened by skill
level. In light of the descriptive evidence presented in the previous section, we explicitly
take into account the possibility that wage dierences are sensitive to the business cycle as
well as the possibility that they dier by age and by the position in the wage distribution.
Due to the inherent identication problem between age, cohort, and time eects on
wages, wage proles based on cross-section relationships between age and wages over a
sequence of years and movements of life-cycle wage proles faced by successive cohorts are
statistically indistinguishable. However, considering the wage growth experienced by a
particular cohort over time or over age, it can be tested whether apart from the dierential
age eect, dierent cohorts exhibit the same time trend. We use the approach developed
by MaCurdy and Mroz (1995), which has also been applied by Fitzenberger et al. (2001)
and Fitzenberger and Wunderlich (2002) for West Germany and by Gosling et al. (2000)
for the UK. For details, see MaCurdy and Mroz (1995) and Fitzenberger and Wunderlich
(2002).
4.1 Characterization of Wage Proles
We denote the age of an employee by  and calendar time by t. A cohort c can be dened
by the year of birth. The variables age, cohort and calendar year are linked by the relation
t = c+ . Studies of wage trends often investigate movements of \age-earnings proles"
(1) ln[w(t; )] = f(t; ) + u :
The deterministic function f measures the systematic variation in wages and u reects
cyclical or transitory phenomena. For a xed year t, the function f(t; ) yields the
conventional cross-sectional wage proles. Movements of f as a function of t describe how
cross-sectional wage proles shift over time. The cross-sectional relation f as a function
of age does not describe \life-cycle" wage growth for any cohort or, put dierently, the
cross-sectional relation may very well be the result of \cohort eects". In fact, \cohort-
earnings proles" are statistically indistinguishable from \age-earnings proles". Wage
proles can also be expressed as a function of cohort and age
(2) g(c; )  g(t  ; )  f(t; )
where the deterministic function g describes how age-earnings proles dier across cohorts.
Holding age constant, g(c; ) describes the proles of wages earned by dierent cohorts
over time. Holding the cohort constant yields the prole experienced by a specic cohort
over time and age. The latter is referred to as the \life-cycle prole", because it reects
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the wage movements over the life-cycle of a given cohort.
The dierent parameterizations g(c; ) and f(t; ) are equivalent representations of
the same wage prole. Without further assumptions, \pure life-cycle eects" due to aging
or \pure cohort eects" cannot be identied. We focus on wage trends for a given cohort.
4.2 Testing for Uniform Wage Growth
Our analysis by skill-group investigates whether wage trends are uniform across cohorts
in the sense that every cohort experiences the same time trend in wages and the same
age-specic wage growth (life-cycle eect). Despite the identication issues discussed
above, the existence of a uniform time trend across cohorts is a testable implication in
the framework presented here. If such a uniform time trend is found, it is designated as
the macroeconomic wage trend for the group of workers considered.
One notion of wage growth proves useful: Wage growth for a given cohort in the labor
market over time (\Insider Wage Growth"), given by
(3)
@g
@t
jc = @g
@
jc  g(c; )  g;
comprising the simultaneous change of time and age. Alternatively, holding age constant
yields the change of wages earned by dierent cohorts at specic ages. For the age at
labor market entry, e, entry wage growth is given by
(4)
@g
@t
j=e =
@g
@c
j=e  gc(c; e) = gc(t  e; e)  e(t) ;
again comprising two eects, namely a change of cohort and time.
If wage growth can be characterized as the sum of a pure aging eect and a pure time
eect in the following way
(5) g = a() + b(t) = a() + b(c+ );
then life-cycle wage growth a() is independent of the calendar year t. This condition is
designated as the \uniform insider wage growth hypothesis". If condition (5) holds, we can
construct a \life-cycle wage prole" independent of the calendar year and a macroeconomic
time trend independent of age. We test condition (5) by testing for the signicance of
interaction terms of  and t in the specication of g.
Integrating back condition (5) on the derivative g with respect to  yields an additive
form for the systematic component of the wage function g(c; ):
(6) g(c; ) = G+K(c) + A() +B(c+ )
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where G +K(c) is the cohort specic constant of integration. At a given point in time,
the wages of cohorts dier only by the age-eect, given by A(), and by a cohort-specic
level, given by K(c). The \uniform insider wage growth hypothesis" HUI can be tested
by investigating whether \interaction terms" R(; t) enter specication (6) which are
constructed as integrals of interaction terms of  and t in g.
4.3 Empirical Implementation
We specify the wage function g(c; ) for individual i in the sample year t using a fairly
exible functional form:
(7) ln[wi;t] = g(ci; i;t) + ut + ui;t
where i;t and ci denote the age of individual i at time t and the cohort of individual i,
respectively. g(c; ) is specied as a smooth function of c and . We further decompose
the error term into a period specic xed eect ut and a stochastic error term uit. In
the empirical analysis, we take 25 years to be the age of entry into the labor market and
we dene  = (age   25)=10 and therefore e = 0. Analogously, since the observation
period starts in 1979, we dene time t = (calendar year   1979)=10. For each cohort, c
corresponds to the time t at which  equals zero. For the cohort of age 25 in the year
1979, c equals zero and older cohorts have negative values for c.
As a exible empirical approximation of the wage prole imposing the hypothesis of
uniform insider wage growth, we use polynomials in age, cohort, and time:
A() = A1+ A(2)() = A1+ A2
2 + A3
3(8)
B(t) = B1t+B(2)(t) = B1t+B2t
2 +B3t
3 +B4t
4 +B5t
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K(c) = K1c+ (1  )Kb(c) + Ka(c)
with  = 1 for c  0 and  = 0 .
We include year dummies that are orthogonalized with respect to B(t) in order to estimate
period specic xed eects ut, i.e. the estimated year eects are uncorrelated with the
estimated smooth time trend B(t), see Fitzenberger and Wunderlich (2002) for details.
We estimate a fth order polynomial in time for B(t), which seems to yield a satisfactory
decomposition of trend and cycle.
The hypothesis of uniform insider wage growth requires equation (6) to hold against a
more general alternative. In order to formulate a test of the hypothesis of uniform insider
wage growth, we consider in the derivative g the following four interaction terms of age
and time t, t2, 2t, and 2t2. The implied non-separable variant of g(c; ) expands (6)
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by incorporating the integrals of these interaction terms, denoted by R1-R4, see MaCurdy
and Mroz (1995) and Fitzenberger and Wunderlich (2002) for details, and we test for
signicance of R1-R4.
Only if the separability condition HUI holds, it is meaningful to construct an index
of a life-cycle wage prole as a function of pure aging and a macroeconomic trend index.
Otherwise, a dierent wage prole would apply for each cohort. Thus, provided HUI
holds, the life-cycle (L) is given by
(9) ln[wL()] = (A1  K1)+ A(2)()
and the macroeconomic (m) wage trend index is given by
(10) ln[wm(t)] = (B1 +K1)t+B(2)(t) :
When interpreting these indices, it is important to recognize that neither the level nor
the coecient on the linear term are identied in a strict econometric sense. In fact,
identication relies on the assumption that the coecient on the linear cohort term is
equal to zero.
This assumption is motivated by equation (5), which allows to decompose wage growth
into a pure age and a pure time eect, which are both common to all cohorts in the labor
market. Setting the linear cohort term to zero is quite natural. If, for instance, also entry
wages grow at the same rate as the time eect b(t) before and during the sample period, the
entire cross-section prole f(; t) exhibits purely parallel shifts over time, a situation, one
would not naturally characterize by \cohort eects". When uniform insider-wage growth
is accepted, our notion of a cohort eect requires a situation where the dierences in
starting points of the common life-cycle prole dier from the macroeconomic wage growth
experienced by the cohorts in the labor market. For this reason, we also orthogonalize
our polynomial specications for Kac and Kbc with respect the linear cohort eect.
The literature typically investigates movements in mean log wages using standard
regression procedures. However, it is also important to measure within-group dierences
and their movement over time. Another group of more descriptive studies (see among
others OECD, 2006), describes the time trends in quantile dierences of wages for some
broadly dened groups of workers in order to analyze trends in wage dispersion on a
fairly aggregated level. However, it is also important to analyze whether within-group
wage dispersion diers across workers with dierent characteristics (see e.g. Lemieux,
2006a; Autor et al., 2008).
Quantile regressions, developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978), provide a very useful
tool to study wage dierences across and within groups of workers with dierent socio-
15
economic characteristics and how they evolve over time. For general  2 (0; 1), we estimate
conditional quantiles of wages
(11) q(ln[wi;t]jc; ; ) = g(c; ; ) + ut ;
where q;t(ln[wi;t]jc; ; ) denotes the -quantile of the wage in cohort-age-cell (c; ) (
cohort-year-cell (c; t) where t = c + ). The vector  comprises the coecients relating
to the set of regressors ( powers of c;  and t; year dummies). In the empirical analysis,
we model the following quantiles:  = 0:2; 0:5; 0:8 (20%, 50%, and 80% quantile).
We use the minimum-distance approach proposed by Chamberlain (1994) or MaCurdy
and Mroz (1995) for the estimation of quantile regressions when the data on the regressors
can be grouped into cells and censoring is not too severe. The approach consists of
calculating the respective cell quantiles in a rst stage and regressing (by weighted least
squares) those empirical quantiles, which are not censored, on the set of regressors in the
second stage. For the dataset used in this study, the cell sizes are large enough for making
this a fruitful approach. However, for Germany, we do not estimate the 80% quantile for
males in skill-group (H) since censoring is too severe in this case. When applying the
minimum-distance approach, we use the cell sizes as weights.
In the context of this study, we allow for the error terms being dependent across
individuals within cohort-year-cells and across adjacent cohort-year-cells. We use a exible
moving block bootstrap approach allowing for standard error estimates which are robust
against fairly arbitrary heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of the error term. The
block bootstrap approach employed here extends the standard bootstrap procedure in
that it draws blocks of cell observations, including the cell weights, to form the resamples.
We draw a two-dimensional block of observations with block length eight in the cohort
and block length six in the time dimension with replacement until the resample has
become at least as large as the resample size, see Fitzenberger and Wunderlich (2002)
for details. Contrasting the results using the moving-blocks-bootstrap approach with
conventional standard error estimates17 indicates that allowing for correlation between
the error terms within and across cohort-year-cells (when forming the blocks) changes the
estimated standard errors considerably. Thus, it is very likely that such correlation is
present and important for inference.
5 Results
Based on the empirical framework introduced above, this section discusses the estimated
specications and then presents the empirical results.
17The results are available upon request.
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5.1 Estimated Specications for Wage Equations
We estimate two specications for the 20%, 50%, and 80% quantile for males by skill-
groups (U), (M), and (H). The high degree of censoring allows only estimation for the
20% and the 50% quantile in the case of high-skilled (H) males in Germany. The more
general specication (model 1) is given by
g(c; ) = G+ a1+ a2
2 + a3
3 + b1t+ b2t
2 + b3t
3 + b4t
4 + b5t
5
+b2c
2
b + b3c
3
b + a2c
2
a +
4X
j=1
jRj +
2004 Nb 1X
i=1979
iY Di ;(12)
where the age polynomial is of order 3, the time polynomial of order 5, and cb = (1  )c
and ca = c are the cohort terms before and after 1979, orthogonalized with respect to
the linear cohort term. All specications include the cyclical year dummies Y Di which
are orthogonalized with respect to the time trend, thus Nb = 5.
Model 2 is a restricted versions of model 1:
Model 2: j = 0 for j = 1; :::; 4 HUI imposed(13)
Model 2 imposes separability of wage growth into age and time eects. Statistical tests
using the available data imply that skill group specic macro-shifts and life-cycle proles
are both the same across cohorts, i.e. we cannot reject at conventional signicance levels
the hypothesis that interaction eects between age and time are zero (detailed results
are available upon request). The estimation of time trends and life-cycle proles is thus
meaningful.
5.2 Life-Cycle Proles
Figure 6 summarizes graphically the estimated life-cycle proles for workers in the U.S.
and Germany. Note that wage growth over the life-cycle at the median wage, which closely
relates to a standard human capital wage equation (Gosling et al., 2000), is positively
correlated with educational level { i.e., the returns to experience are increasing with
education.
For the group of low-skilled workers, the pattern of wage growth over the life-cycle
diers across the two countries. While in the U.S., workers experience wage growth over
their entire life-cycle as well as increasing wage dispersion within cohorts as the cohorts
age, wages at the median and above of their German counterparts experience considerably
lower wage growth. Wage growth at the 20% quantile is quite similar to that in the U.S..
On the other hand, workers in the U.S. experience faster wage growth at the median and
at the 80% quantile, while German workers experience slower wage growth at the median
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and the 80% quantile, leading to a decreasing within-cohort wage dispersion in Germany,
but rising within-cohort wage dispersion in the U.S..
What are possible causes of these cross-national dierences? The decreasing within-
cohort wage dispersion over time for German low-skilled workers may be due to a selection-
process. Older German low-skilled workers at the bottom of the skill-specic wage distri-
bution might drop out of the labor-market as they get older, e.g. due to layos, if their
productivity lies below the wages set by union wage agreements. Another reason might be
that U.S. low-skilled workers are more heterogeneous than German low-skilled workers, as
in the U.S. on-the-job training or internal education after entering the workforce is more
widespread among low-skilled workers than it is in Germany, where the educational and
training systems tend to be more formal.
For the U.S., the group of medium-skilled workers is dened as those who nished
high-school and those who subsequently received between one and three years of college
education { 55% to 60% of the U.S. workforce falls within this category. Medium-skilled
workers in Germany are the largest group of employees, making up 75% to 80% of the
workforce. Workers in this group typically receive vocational training after nishing
between nine and ten years of secondary schooling, resulting in a total of twelve to thirteen
years of formal education. Interestingly, for the U.S., wages at and above the median
change quite similarly, exhibiting cumulated growth over the life-cycle of about 40 log
pp, just as wages at the 80% quantile in Germany do. Wages at the median in Germany
rise only about 28 log pp though. At the lower end of the distribution in the U.S.
workers experience higher cumulated wage growth (32 log pp) over their life-cycle as well,
compared to their German counterparts (23 log pp). Thus, contrary to the low-skilled,
the increase of within-cohort wage dispersion associated with aging is twice as strong for
German medium-skilled workers compared to U.S. medium-skilled workers.
For the group of high-skilled workers in the U.S., wages increase 48, 55, and 56 log pp
over the life-cycle at the 20%, 50%, and 80% quantile, respectively { resulting once again
in an increasing within-cohort wage dispersion for this skill-group. Recall, that due to
censoring in the German data, we restrict ourselves to the 20% quantile and the median
for the group of high-skilled workers in Germany. Life-cycle wage growth for workers at
the 20% quantile results in a cumulated gain of 56 log pp over the life-cycle. Examining
the life-cycle prole at the median wage for high-skilled workers based on the conditional
quantile models described above shows stronger life-cycle wage growth than for other
skill-groups, resulting in a cumulated gain of 55-60 log pp over the life-cycle. The increase
until age 50 is about 10 log pp higher at the median compared to the 20% quantile.
The results regarding the development of wage dispersion over the life-cycle for the U.S.
are in line with ndings for the UK (Gosling et al., 2000). The growth of wage dispersion
over the life-cycle conditional on education is negatively correlated with skill level, i.e. in
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the U.S. low-skilled workers experience the highest increase in wage dispersion over the
life-cycle, while for Germany dispersion increases most strongly for medium-skilled in the
upper part of the wage distribution.
5.3 Time-Trends
Figure 7 depicts trends in real wages due to macroeconomic-shifts in the U.S. and Ger-
many. The macroeconomic-shifts aect all cohorts uniformly within the same skill-group
at the same point in time (but at dierent points in their life-cycle). These macro-shifts
are purged of cohort eects and of life-cycle eects. At rst glance we see that time-trends
in the U.S. were more positive for workers with higher educational attainment than for
low- and medium-skilled workers. Comparing low- and medium-skilled workers in Ger-
many at the dierent quantiles, we see that time-trends in wages were roughly the same
across skill-groups. Time-trends for German high-skilled workers were similar to those
of less skilled workers until the early 1990s, but wage growth was stronger thereafter.
Finally, our estimates suggest that time-trends in wages developed more positively for
German workers than for U.S. workers.
The mid-1990s mark a turning point in the development of the macro wage indices of
both low-skilled and medium-skilled worker in the U.S.. Until that point in time, workers
in both subgroups experienced real wage losses throughout the entire wage distribution,
being stronger for the low-skilled (-30 log pp at the 80% and 20% quantile and -32 log pp
at the median). Medium-skilled workers incurred losses of -11, -20, and -22 log pp with at
the 80%, 50%, and 20% quantile, respectively. Between 1996 and 2004, however, wages
grew considerably at all considered quantiles of both low- and medium-skilled workers.
Wages of the low-skilled at the 20% quantile grew about 10 log pp, wages at the median
and at the 80% quantile experienced a gain of 5 log pp. In the group of the medium-
skilled, the wage growth starting in the mid-1990s was less pronounced. Wage growth
was about 4 log pp at both the 20% and the 80% quantile and about 3 log pp at the
median. Time-trends are most positive for the group of high-skilled workers in the U.S.,
with a cumulated wage growth of -1, 8, and 17 log pp at the 20%, 50%, and 80% quantile,
respectively, between 1979 and 2004.
For low-skilled workers in Germany, the 20%, 50%, and 80% quantiles of the wage
distribution move in a parallel manner between 1979 and 1992, resulting in an uniform
gain of about 8 log pp along the entire distribution. Thereafter, wages at the 80% quantile
exhibit small gains, while the wages at the 20% quantile decrease, resulting in real wage
losses of 5 log pp between 1992 and 2004. Wages at the median remain at during this
period.18. Medium-skilled workers in Germany do slightly better than low-skilled workers,
18One possible cause for the declines in wages among low-skilled workers at the lower end of this wage
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in terms of time-trends at the lower end of the skill-specic wage-distribution. Time-trends
for wages at and above the median are fairly similar. Cumulated wage growth at the 20%
quantile for German medium-skilled workers is slightly above zero, compared to real wage
losses of about 2 log pp in the group of the low-skilled. However, this masks the fact that
since the beginning of the 1990s, real wage losses are more pronounced among low-skilled
workers in the lower part of the distribution. Wages at the 20% quantile of German high-
skilled workers were staying at since the beginning of the 1990s. Over the entire period,
cumulated wage growth is about 1 log pp for this group at the 20% quantile. The time-
trend for German high-skilled workers at the median starts to increase monotonically in
the early 1980s, at an annual rate of about 0.5 log pp. Wages at the 20% quantile were
rising between the early 1980s and the early 1990s, but then started to atten out.
5.4 Cohort-eects and Entry Wage Growth
Cohort-eects can occur for at least two reasons. The rst relates to supply-side eects,
as discussed by Card and Lemieux (2001), who argue that the increasing wage-premium
between college graduates and high-school graduates is due to a slowdown in the growth
of supply of higher-skilled workers. The second is an interaction between tenure and
wage dispersion, as put forward by Gernandt and Pfeier (2007), who nd that wage
dispersion was rising most strongly among workers with low tenure in Germany.19 In
addition, cohort eects may be implied by wage adjustments which are strongest among
younger workers and which persist over the life cycle. These interpretations are not
necessarily contradictory.
Figure 8 plots the estimated cohort eects for the dierent groups in both economies.
These are quadratic and cubic terms for cohorts that enter the labor market before and
after 1979, orthogonalized to the linear cohort term. For both medium- and high-skilled
workers in the U.S., negative cohort eects are estimated for the oldest cohorts and
positive eects for the youngest cohorts. For low-skilled workers, we nd positive cohort-
eects for the youngest cohorts and negative ones for the oldest cohorts at the 80%
quantile. Interestingly, we nd that during the 1980s cohort-eects had a positive eect on
medium-skilled and high-skilled workers { this is the period for which Card and Lemieux
(2001) observed increasing skill-premia among younger workers for the U.S..20
distribution (and therefore at the lower end in the overall wage distribution) may be the large inow
(immigration) of low-skilled workers into West-Germany after the reunication, resulting in an higher
supply of low-skilled workers, in combination with the recession that took place in Germany in 1992/93,
see section 3
19Changes in educational policy, or more generally, any pre-labor market conditions, may also be
captured by cohort-eects in our specication.
20Increasing wage dispersion due to cohort eects across skill-groups may also indicate selection eects,
i.e. the "ability" of workers within skill-groups can change over time, see section 1.
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For Germany, for all skill-groups, both the youngest and the oldest cohorts exhibit
negative cohort-eects, relative to the cohorts entering the labor market between the
mid-1960s and mid-1980.21 Furthermore, the youngest cohorts experience higher within-
cohort wage dispersion due to these eects.
Cohort eects and time-trends additively dene entry wage growth. To see the inter-
action between the macroeconomic-shifts and the cohort-specic eects, gure 9 plots the
development of entry wages conditional on educational achievement. During 1979 and
2004 entry-wages in the U.S. become more dispersed among medium- and high-skilled
workers, and less dispersed for U.S. low-skilled workers. However, the decline of entry
wages for the latter group is severe throughout the skill specic distribution. Entry wages
decline for medium-skilled workers, while they rise for high-skilled U.S. workers. The
overall within skill-group wage dispersion increases by 10 log pp for the medium-skilled
and 15 log pp for the high-skilled. The dierence between the medians across skill-groups
increases by 22 log pp. However, this is primarily due to time-eects across skill-groups.
Cohort-eects across skill-groups seem to play a minor role.
Entry wages for German workers across skill-groups begin to disperse in the early
1990s. Strong negative cohort eects { being larger in size for the lesser skilled workers
{ for the youngest cohorts complement the dispersion stemming from the time-trends.
For low- and medium-skilled workers, wages at the median in 2004 lie below their level
from 1979, whereby losses are more pronounced for low-skilled workers at all observed
quantiles. Furthermore, wage dispersion among low-skilled workers is more pronounced
than for medium-skilled workers. Entry-wages of high-skilled workers at the median are
about 10 log pp higher in 2004 than in 1979, while the dierence to wages at the 20%
quantile in this group increased by 20 log pp.
5.5 Rising Wage Dispersion or Polarization of Wages?
5.5.1 Development of Skill-Premia due to Macroeconomic-Shifts
How much of the increase in wage dispersion in the U.S. and Germany is due to rising
skill-premia across educational groups? Some studies have suggested that this part is
substantial. For example Lemieux (2006b) nds that almost half of the increase in wage
inequality in the U.S. can be explained by changes in skill-premia. For Germany our
descriptive results in section 3 show that the rise of the skill-premium between medium-
and low-skilled workers and the increase in dispersion in the lower part of the German wage
distribution in the 1990s take place during the same period. Most of the rise of the skill-
premium between high- and medium-skilled workers occurs also after 1990. Dustmann
21Due to the severe censoring, we nd only cohort eects for the younger German high-skilled workers.
The youngest high-skilled workers are also negatively aected by cohort-eects.
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et al. (2009) nd that price eects seem to play a major role in explaining the increase
in lower-tail inequality in Germany, without quantifying the exact impact of the rising
skill-premium on wage-inequality though.
To answer this, Figure 10 depicts the development of the time-trends of median wages
across skill groups and the dierence between skill-groups. Cumulated wage growth over
time in the U.S. at the median is positively correlated with skill level, which we interpret
as increasing skill-premium. This steady rise in relative productivity of higher skilled
workers in the U.S. may be explained by SBTC.22 In contrast to the U.S. experience, until
the mid-1990s median-wages of German workers across skill-groups move in a parallel
manner. Since then, wages of the high-skilled exhibit higher growth rates than those
of low- and medium-skilled workers, while the skill-premium across medium- and low-
skilled German workers does not change over time. The latter observation is somewhat
surprising, as the unconditional dispersion between those two groups at the median is
clearly increasing since the end of the 1980s (see gure 5). What can explain these
dierences between the unconditional development of the skill-premium and the time-
trends? Below we provide evidence that negative cohort-eects for young low-skilled
workers have contributed to the increasing skill-premium observed unconditionally23 {
which can be very well in line with the immigration story, that is an inow of young
low-skilled workers into West Germany after the fall of the iron curtain. Moreover, and
at least as important, we nd that the decline in average age of low-skilled workers and
changes in the age-structure of the group of the medium-skilled (gure 4) contributed
to the rising skill-premium in Germany, as gure 12 reveals. Mechanically this happens
because the median wage of the medium-skilled (low-skilled) workers increases (decreases)
as medium-skilled (low-skilled) workers become older (younger). Finally, unions may have
successfully counteracted an increasing skill-premium between medium- and low-skilled
workers, which otherwise would have prevailed due to technological change. The same
mechanical compositional eects account for roughly 40% of the sharp increase of 17 log
pp in the skill-premium between medium- and high-skilled workers in Germany during the
early 1990s and 2004, which is observed unconditionally, the remainder being explained
by diverging time trends. Note that dispersion due to time trends only starts to increase
at the beginning of the 1990s, whereas the skill-premium in the U.S. had already been
rising sharply. During the early 1980s, time-trends seem to play no substantial role
in explaining the somewhat increasing skill-premium between medium- and high-skilled
22Note that the wage-premium of U.S. medium-skilled over low-skilled workers due to macroeconomic-
shifts stopped to increase entirely since the mid-1990s. It even started to slightly decrease and also did
so unconditionally. This indicates that { possibly due to a more nuanced version of SBTC { wages at the
median across skill-groups have polarized since the mid-1990s in the U.S..
23Section 5.5.3 summarizes compositional eects on wage growth and wage dispersion both across and
within skill-groups.
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German workers observed unconditionally. While the change of the age-structure accounts
for some of the increase, so might changes in the cohort-structure.
For the U.S., we nd that the time-trends describe the same patterns for the skill-
premia as the ones observed unconditionally { but not to the full extent. During the 1980s,
when the skill-premium between medium- and low-skilled U.S. workers increased, negative
cohort eects for the low-skilled were at work, perhaps again the eect of immigration.
The declining age of low-skilled workers also contributed to the rising wage-premium,
while the age-structure of medium-skilled workers was quite stable during the 1980s.
Regarding the wage-premium between high-skilled and medium-skilled in the U.S., we
see that the aging of the high-skilled contributed to an increasing premium during the
1980s. Overall, we thus observe somewhat similar patterns regarding the compositional
eects on the wage-premia for the U.S. and Germany.
Macroeconomic shifts are smooth functions of SBTC, institutional factors,24 and
supply-side factors, whereby the ways in which these functional arguments interact are a
priori not clear. Given that we observe two industrialized countries over the same period
of time, it is likely that they had access to the same technologies. Hence our results pro-
vide evidence that technological change alone is not able to explain rising wage inequality
as the wage-premium due to macro-economic shifts between German low- and medium-
skilled workers is constant over the entire period and comparing high- to medium-skilled
workers it only starts rising at the beginning of the 1990s. In fact, supply-side and insti-
tutional factors seem to play a key role in explaining the widening of the wage dispersion
between the skill-groups for Germany. A more promising approach to explain changes in
wage-inequality over time might thus be to consider, to a larger extent, the interaction
between labor market institutions, supply-side eects, and SBTC.25 Note that trends in
relative labor-supply across skill-groups as well as the age-pattern within skill groups are
showing very similar trends in both countries. This indicates that institutional factors {
and their interaction with SBTC { may be more important than supply-side factors in
explaining the cross-national dierences.
5.5.2 Wage Dispersion within Skill-Groups
As the skill-premium due to time-trends only changed to a small extent in Germany, most
of the increase of wage dispersion in Germany is therefore likely to be due to diverging
time-trends within skill-groups. Figure 11 depicts for the two countries the development
of overall wage inequality due to macroeconomic shifts within skill-groups, as measured
by the dierence of the time trends at the 80% quantile and the 20% quantile, as well as
24Besides deunionization and the minimum wage, institutional factors can reect social norms and
incentives set by tax-systems.
25This point has also been made by Lemieux (2008).
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the wage dispersion in the upper and the lower part of the wage distribution, as measured
by the 80%-50% and 50%-20% dierence, respectively.
Low-skilled workers in the U.S. experienced an astonishing decline in wage dispersion
in the lower part of the wage distribution starting in the mid-1980s. After a short period
of a rising 50%-20% dierence of 2 log pp, wages at the median dropped more sharply then
wages at the 20% quantile until 1996 (and thereafter increased more slowly), resulting in
a decreasing dispersion of the lower part of the wage-distribution. Moreover, this decrease
is the driving force behind the decline of overall decreasing wage inequality, as measured
by the 80%-20% dierence, as the inequality in the upper part was quite stable between
1980 and the end of the 1990s (thereafter wage inequality in the upper part decreased by
about 2 log pp). 26
Increasing wage inequality among U.S. medium-skilled workers since the early 1990s
masks a polarization pattern which starts as early as the end of the 1980s. Up until then,
wage inequality in the upper as well as the lower end of the wage distribution of this
group increased in a parallel way. Afterwards, the 80%-50% dierence kept increasing
monotonically, while the 50%-20% dierence started to fall. Mechanically, this results in
a small increase of the 80%-20% dierence since the beginning of the 1990s.
Our results regarding wage inequality of U.S. low-skilled workers and the lower part
of U.S. medium-skilled workers for the 1980s may reect "episodic events", such as the
declining real minimum wage and deunionization, and are thus in line with Card and
DiNardo (2002).27 The polarization of wages, beginning at the end of the 1980s, has also
been documented by Autor and Dorn (2009), who argue that the low-skill service sector is
the driving force. What is also interesting is the fact that the polarizing pattern { purely
due to macroeconomic shifts { sets in at least ve years before the general recovery of
wages in the U.S. in the mid-1990s.
The highest increase of overall wage dispersion, as well as dispersion in the lower
part of the distribution, is observed for the group of high-skilled workers in the U.S. In
1986, the 80%-20% dierence was at the same level as in 1979, then started to increase
monotonically until reaching a cumulated growth of 17 log pp in 2004, which is an increase
of about 1 log pp per year. Since 1986, we also observe a steep increase of the 80%-50%
dierence after a drop by -2 log pp before. Accumulated wage dispersion over the entire
period is a slightly stronger for the 50%-20% dierence (9 log pp), compared to 8 log pp
for the 80%-50% dierence.28 Neither unions nor minimum wages are likely to have a large
26During the rst half of the 1990s we nd some support for within-skill-group polarization of wages, as
the 80%-50% dierence slightly increases while the 50%-20% dierence sharply drops during that period.
27A recent study by Chernozhukov et al. (2009), building upon DiNardo et al. (1996), shows that
minimum wage seems to play a larger role in 50-10 increase than deunioninzation. Autor et al. (2008),
in the same line, concur that the decline of the minimum wage contributed to the rising lower tail
wage-inequality.
28Note though that the 50%-20% dierence plateaued during the second half of the 1990s, while the
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impact on the developments of wages in this group. It is rather likely that technological
change had heterogeneous eects among the group of college-graduates (see Lemieux,
2006b). Moreover, changes in social norms might have played a certain role especially for
this group (see Piketty and Saez, 2003).
After a short period of decreasing overall wage inequality in Germany between 1979
and 1982, low-skilled workers experience a large increase in wage dispersion, whereby the
increasing 50%-20% dierence is the main cause of the rise in overall wage dispersion,
starting in the mid-1990s. Again, a large inow of ethnic Germans and immigration
from East to West Germany after the reunication may be one driving force behind
this phenomenon, assuming that these workers nd themselves in the lower end of the
wage distribution. Furthermore, unemployment rates in Germany are high among those
workers, hence there might also be selection processes driving these developments.
Until the mid-1990s, the 50%-20% dierence of medium-skilled workers in Germany
remained almost unchanged, compared to 1979. Overall wage inequality rose to about
4 log pp until then, purely driven by an increasing dispersion in the upper part of the
wage distribution. Since the mid-1990s wage dispersion is increasing monotonically both
in the lower- and upper part of the distribution, resulting in a cumulated increase in wage
dispersion of 3 log pp in the lower part and 7 log pp in the upper part, aggregating to a
10 log pp increase in accumulated overall wage dispersion between 1979 and 2004. These
results are qualitatively similar to those in Dustmann et al. (2009), who observe that wage
inequality in the lower part of the entire wage distribution did not start to rise until the
mid-1990s.
The 50%-20% dierence of high-skilled workers is quite at until the early 1990s, when
it starts to increase monotonically at an annual rate of about .8 log pp until the end of
our observed period. The late increase in wage dispersion among German high-skilled
workers is interesting considering the fact that unconditional wage dispersion in Germany
at the top already started to increase during the 1980s. Apparently this was not caused
by an increasing within-wage dispersion among high-skilled workers below the median.
Unfortunately, we cannot pin down the trends above the median.
What explains these dierences in the development of polarization between the U.S.
and Germany? For the U.S., we see patterns of polarization due to macroeconomic shifts
both within and across skill-groups.29 For Germany, we nd little evidence after the early
1980s for polarization of unconditional wages and of wage inequality within skill-groups.30
Only the estimated skill specic time trends at the median show polarization in Germany.
80%-50% dierence kept increasing. For this period we nd evidence of polarization within the group of
U.S. high-skilled workers.
29Autor et al. (2008) also document this pattern of polarization both within and between skill-groups.
30Note that employment has polarized in Germany since the 1980s (see e.g. Spitz-Oener, 2006; Dust-
mann et al., 2009).
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As Fitzenberger (1999) and Dustmann et al. (2009) point out, the development of the
German wage structure is consistent with the SBTC story, if one allows for institutional
factors, such as unions and implicit minimum wages implied by the welfare state, which,
in comparison to the U.S., delayed the widening of the German wage dispersion in the
lower part for about ten years. A further explanation might be that social norms in
Germany have been dierent, an explanation which is put forward by Piketty and Saez
(2003) for other continental European countries as well. Along the line of the argument
brought forward by Chernozhukov et al. (2009) (i.e. the decline of the minimum wage
in the 1980s in the U.S. counteracted the polarization of wages during that period), it
is conceivable that the deunionization in Germany during the 1990s and the early 2000s
counteracted a polarization of wages.
5.5.3 Compositional Eects on Wage growth and Inequality
Figure 6 depicts the life-cycle proles of wage growth conditional on education, showing
that inequality varies by age. To illustrate this, gure 12 plots the eect of the changing
age structure on wage growth and (implicitly) on wage dispersion. This is done by using
the estimates of the life-cycle prole of wages and the changing distribution of ages to
calculate the implied change in wages. The increase of the mean ages both of medium-
and high-skilled workers in the U.S. reect the changes of the age structure which result in
increasing wages in these two subgroups. However, wage inequality only slightly increases
due to the changing age structure. The trend for low-skilled workers in the U.S. is re-
versed: The mean age decreases between 1979 and 2004, and changes in the age-structure
lead to decreasing wages as well as less wage-inequality over time, being mainly driven by
declining wage dispersion in the lower part of the wage distribution. Comparing the devel-
opment of the wages at the medians across skill-groups, it is clear that, rst, throughout
the entire period the changing age structure among low- and medium-skilled U.S. work-
ers led to an increasing skill-premium between medium and low, second, that during the
1980s, the aging of high-skilled workers led to an increasing skill-premium between high
and medium.
For Germany the results dier for the low-skilled. Although the age-pattern is quali-
tatively the same between 1979 and 2004 compared to the U.S., the rejuvenation of this
skill-group, indicated by a decrease of the mean age, leads to an increasing within wage
dispersion over time, as the 20% quantile in this group experiences the largest life-cycle
wage growth. The changing age-structure of medium- and high-skilled workers in Ger-
many, indicated by the rise of the mean age starting in the late 1990s, mechanically leads
to an increasing wages for both groups. The age-decomposition eect only plays a minor
role in explaining changes of wage dispersion conditional on education though. The aging
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of German medium-skilled workers since the early 1990s led to an increasing skill-premium
between low- and medium-skilled workers, which, as we have shown above, is not due to
macro-economic shifts. Similarly, dierences in the pattern of aging between medium-
and high-skilled workers led to an increasing skill-premium between those two groups.
Figures 13 and 14 depict the impact of the inow and outow of the cohorts on skill-
specic wage growth and dispersion, respectively. The latter graphs show that starting
in the early 1990s, the change in the cohort structure supports the catching-up process of
both wages at the median and the 20% quantile to wages at the 80% quantile in the group
of low-skilled workers in the U.S.. The 80-50 and 80-20 dierence of wages had increased
before, though, due to cohort-eects. Contrary to that, cohort-eects in Germany for the
group of low-skilled led to an increasing wage dispersion of about 5 log pp throughout
the entire wage-distribution between 1992 and 2004, while before the early 1990s, cohort
eects led to a decreasing wage dispersion, with the movements of the 80-20 dierence
mainly being driven by changes of the wage dispersion in the lower part. Cohort eects for
medium- and high-skilled workers aect wage dispersion somewhat less in both countries.
Relatively to the oldest and the youngest cohorts, those in the middle seem to exhibit
higher cohort-specic wage dispersion, driven mostly by positive cohort-eects at the
median and the 80% quantile. In the middle of the observed period, the presence of these
cohorts in the middle is strongest, resulting in the strongest increase in wage dispersion
within skill groups. Based on gure 13, the sharp drop of cohort eects among low-skilled
German workers mechanically increases the wage-premium between low- and medium-
skilled workers in Germany. Compositional eects regarding the cohort structure also
seem to increase the skill-premium between high-and medium-skilled workers in Germany
since the early 1990s. For the U.S., these kind of compositional eects seem to play only
a minor role.
5.6 Employment Growth
In order to describe employment growth along the wage distribution and to detect possible
polarization of employment, we use a method similar to that proposed by Card et al.
(1999). We rank the age-education cells across skill-groups for a base year according to
the cells unconditional median wages, normalized by the estimated age-specic life-cycle
wage growth of the specic cells.31 Then we calculate the cumulated relative employment
growth of each cell over the next ten years.32 Our age variable is discrete, ranging between
31Cells whose median wages are top-coded { this happens frequently for the group of high-skilled
German workers { are given the highest ranks, whereby the general pattern of the graphs is not aected
by the chosen order. We thus draw random numbers to determine the order of the ranks at the top-end.
32Note that in the latter period dierent workers are in those cells, as the age is held constant for each
cell.
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25 and 55, and we distinguish between three educational levels, which yields 93 cells for
this analysis, which Card et al. (1999) interpret as "skill-groups". The base years we
choose are 1979, 1984, 1989, and 1999. The results are depicted in gures 15 and 16.
For the base years 1979 and 1984, relative changes in employment in both economies
is a monotonically increasing function of the rank of wages in the base year. We nd
evidence of employment polarization in Germany starting with the base year 1989, which
becomes more pronounced for the base year 1994. This means that for the latter two
base years, age-education cells which are ranked at the bottom exhibit higher growth
rates than those at the middle, while the highest ranked age-education exhibit the largest
growth rates. For the U.S. we observe a similar pattern of polarization starting in the
second half of the 1990s. There are striking similarities in the four graphs between the
U.S. and Germany.
This simple analysis helps us to separate demand-side vs. supply-side stories. In the
U.S., we observe polarization in wages and employment, as a nuanced version of the
SBTC-story would suggest, while in Germany we observe polarization in employment but
little evidence for polarization in wages. The latter observation might also be caused by
immigration into West Germany for example. Hence, only for the U.S. the broad ndings
are consistent with a pure demand-side story.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines trends in wage inequality in the U.S. and Germany. A cross-national
comparison of these trends is important as some explanations for the widening gap in
wages between highly skilled workers and lower skilled workers, for example SBTC, should
apply to both economies. The methods we employ enable us to separately identify life-
cycle wage proles, trends in wages (due to macroeconomic shifts), and cohort wage
eects.
We nd that, for workers of all skill levels in the U.S. and for higher skilled workers
in Germany, there is increasing wage inequality over the life cycle. In contrast, for low-
skilled workers in Germany there is decreasing wage inequality over the life cycle. The
changing age structure of the workforce has important implications for trends in wage
inequality in both the U.S. and in Germany. Aging among higher skilled workers tends to
increase both wage levels and wage inequality in both countries. However, the decline in
age among low-skilled workers has dierent eects in the U.S. compared to Germany. In
the U.S., this decline in age has the eect of lowering wages and lowering wage inequality.
However, in Germany a decline in age tends to lower wages but increases wage inequality.
There exist important cohort eects for Germany. Both the old and the young cohorts
of workers have sizeable negative cohort eects. These eects could be the result of supply-
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side factors such as immigration, cohort size, or selection into skill-group. In the U.S., by
contrast, the size of the cohort eects is substantially smaller.
The time trends in wages tend to favor highly skilled workers in both the U.S. and
in Germany. In the U.S. there were secular declines in wages until the mid-1990s for
low- and medium-skilled workers when these trends reversed. In Germany, we see the
opposite pattern { rising secular trends in wages until the mid-1990s and a attening (at
the median) or a decline (at the 20% quantile) in wages afterwards. The result of these
trends is that in recent years we have seen an increase in wage inequality among low-
skilled workers in Germany and a decline in wage inequality among lower skilled workers
in the U.S..
We also nd a rising skill premium in both the U.S. and in Germany. In Germany,
however, the rising skill premium between medium- and low-skilled workers is entirely the
result of cohort eects and aging eects. The rise for high-skilled compared to medium-
skilled workers is mostly restricted to the period after the mid-1990s.
In the U.S., we see faster wage growth at the top (80% quantile) and bottom (20%
quantile). This has been interpreted as evidence of polarization in previous studies (e.g.
Autor et al., 2008). We see only little evidence of wage polarization in Germany after
the early 1980s, with the exception being that conditional time trends at the median are
quite similar for medium-skilled and low-skilled workers.
Summing up, there is a lot of similar evidence in wages { and in particular in em-
ployment { in the U.S. and Germany which is consistent with a technology driven polar-
ization of labor market. However, the patterns in wage inequality in the two countries
dier strongly, so that it is unlikely that technology eects alone { which presumably are
common across countries { can explain the empirical ndings. Episodic changes resulting
from changes in institutional factors such as unionization or the minimum wage may ex-
plain the dierences, which are partly reected in the cross-country dierences in cohort
eects. Institutional factors in Germany might have led to increased inequality among
less skilled groups after 1985, which more than oset technology driven trends in the lower
part of the wage distribution. Another possibility is that SBTC interacts in important
ways with institutional factors and that dierences in institutions across economies are
the reason why we observe dierent trends in inequality across the U.S. and Germany.
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Figure 1: Total Unconditional Cumulated Wage growth at 20%, 50%, 80% quantiles and
quantile dierences, 1979-2004 for males, left: U.S., right: Germany
33
Low-Skilled Males U.S.
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−
0.
4
−
0.
3
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0.
0
YEAR
Cu
m
. W
a
ge
 G
ro
w
th
20
50
80
Low-Skilled Males Germany
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
YEAR
Cu
m
. W
a
ge
 G
ro
w
th
20
50
80
Medium-Skilled Males U.S.
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−
0.
3
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
YEAR
Cu
m
. W
a
ge
 G
ro
w
th
20
50
80
Medium-Skilled Males Germany
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
YEAR
Cu
m
. W
a
ge
 G
ro
w
th
20
50
80
High-Skilled Males U.S.
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
YEAR
Cu
m
. W
a
ge
 G
ro
w
th
20
50
80
High-Skilled Males Germany
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
YEAR
Cu
m
. W
a
ge
 G
ro
w
th
20
50
Figure 2: Unconditional Cumulated Wage growth 1979-2004 for males, left: U.S., right:
Germany
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Figure 3: Unconditional Cumulated wage dispersion 1979-2004 for males, left: U.S., right:
Germany
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Figure 4: Employment Shares and Mean Age 1979-2004 for males, left: U.S., right:
Germany
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Figure 5: Unconditional Wage Premia, left: U.S., right: Germany
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Figure 6: Lifecycle indicies 1979-2004 for males, left: U.S., right: Germany
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Figure 7: Time Trends 1979-2004 for males, left: U.S., right: Germany
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Figure 8: Cohort Eects 1979-2004 for males, left: U.S., right: Germany
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Figure 9: Cumulated growth of Entry Wages, left: U.S., right: Germany
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Figure 10: Medians of Educational Groups 1979-2004 for males, left: U.S., right: Germany
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Figure 11: Dierences in Time Trends 1979-2004 for males, left: U.S., right: Germany
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Figure 12: Eect of change in the age structure on wage growth: 1979-2004 for males,
left: U.S., right: Germany
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Figure 13: Eect of change in the cohort structure on wage growth: 1979-2004 for males,
left: U.S., right: Germany
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Figure 14: Eect of change in the cohort structure on wage dispersion: 1979-2004 for
males, left: U.S., right: Germany.
46
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
2.
5
3.
0
Rank in 1979
R
el
at
ive
 C
ha
ng
e 
of
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
2.
5
3.
0
Rank in 1984
R
el
at
ive
 C
ha
ng
e 
of
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
2.
5
3.
0
Rank in 1989
R
el
at
ive
 C
ha
ng
e 
of
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
2.
5
3.
0
Rank in 1994
R
el
at
ive
 C
ha
ng
e 
of
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Figure 15: Pattern of changes in Employment, U.S.
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Figure 16: Pattern of changes in Employment, Germany
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